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Contracts, Conditions, and the Clayton Act: Causes
of Action Available to a Dealer Injured by
an Exclusive-Dealing Arrangement
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although a seller may have many legitimate motives for engaging in exclusive-dealing arrangements1-arrangements in which the
buyer agrees not to deal in goods of the seller's competitors-two
anticompetitive results are unavoidable: foreclosure of channels of
sale to competitors and limitation of the buyers' freedom of choice.2
With the express intent of advancing the public welfare through
the preservation of free competition,3 the Congress of the United
States enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914.4 Section 3 of this
Act5 provides that it shall be unlawful (1) to make a sale or contract
for sale (2) on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the
1. Presumably, a seller's primary motive for engaging in exclusive arrangements
is to increase profits. Subsidiary motives may include desires to increase predictability,
to utilize facilities more fully, to decrease overtime production and idle time, and to
reduce inventory. Moreover, a seller may be able to eliminate cost incurred in the
transfer of goods from one party to another through the use of exclusive arrange•
ments. See Kessler &: Stern, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE
L.J. I, 2-4 (1959).
2. A buyer's freedom of choice is limited by an agreement to deal exclusively with
a particular seller even though he voluntarily agrees to it. He is bound by the agree•
ment to the extent that, regardless of his future wishes, he cannot purchase products
sold by competitors of the seller. Thus, if the buyer expands his sales facilities or
increases his volume by advertising, he can sell only the seller's product to these
additional customers. In contrast, the dealer who has entered an agreement for a
specific quantity of merchandise may apply competitive products to the additional sales
that were created by his increased efforts.
3. 51 CONG. REc. 9262 (1914) (remarks of Congressman McGillicuddy). Section 3 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), has been characterized as designed to promote
horizontal competition both among those who seek distributive outlets and between
buyers and sellers. These two rather specific policies have not been uniformly recognized. The A'ITORNEY GENERAL NATL. COMM. ON A.NnTRusr LAW, REPORT 136 (1955)
intimates that a refused dealer should have a valid claim when his termination results
from a defendant's pattern of selling exclusively to those who refrain from handling
competitive goods. The Report attributes the fact that such suits have met with little
success to a belief by the courts that § 3 is fundamentally designed to protect only the
seller's competitors. More commonly, courts recognize the policy underlying the antitrust laws to be preservation of competition, a policy· under which both narrower
policies would qualify. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150,
220-22 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
4. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19-22, 27, 44; 29
u.s.c. §§ 52-53 (1964).
5. Section 3 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ••• to lease or make a
sale or contract for sale of gooi:ls, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities • . • for use, consumption, or resale • • • on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a
competitor ••• where the effect ••• may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly ••••
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964) [hereinafter § SJ.
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purchasers not deal in the goods of a competitor of the seller6
(3) when the effect of such an agreement may be substantially to
lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly. 7 Section 4 of the
Clayton Act provides, as an important corollary to section 3, that
private parties injured as a result 0£8 a violation of section 3 are entitled to bring suit for treble damages. 9 Despite the apparent clarity
of these statutory provisions, the determination of the exact nature
of the rights vested in a party injured by an exclusive-dealing arrangement has consistently posed one of the most perplexing prob6. Section 3 applies whether the contract explicitly provides that the buyer shall
deal exclusively with the seller or whether the agreement is a requirements contract
designed to fulfill all the buyer's needs. Standard Oil Co. of California 8c Standard
Stations, Inc. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346
(1922). The section also encompasses tying agreements-agreements that condition the
sale of one commodity on the purchase of another. See United States v. Loew's, Inc.,
371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I (1958); TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Morton Salt v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488
(1942).

7. This economic aspect of § 3 has received its basic interpretation in two Supreme
Court decisions. In Standard Oil of California 8c Standard Stations, Inc. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), the Court rejected a detailed economic analysis of the
conditions surrounding the exclusive-dealing arrangement and held that this "clause
of section 3 is satisfied by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial
share of the line of commerce affected." 337 U.S. at 314. This decision sparked severe
criticism by many who felt that the "quantitative substantiality" test was too mechanical for such a subtle and complex field. See, e.g., Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and
the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 S. Cr. REv.
267, 275-76. In 1961, the Court relaxed the vigor of the Standard Stations decision in
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Co. 365 U.S. 320 (1961). In Tampa, the Court made
the Standard Stations test a more flexible one that involves essentially a weighing of
relevant factors. The Court considered "the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of commerce
in the relevant market areas, and the probable immediate and future effects which
preemption of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein."
365 U.S. at 329. Moreover, the Court was willing to consider the legitimate needs that
might be served by exclusive dealing. 365 U.S. at 327-29. See generally M. HANDLER,
ANTITRUsr IN PERSPECTIVE 29-48 (1957): Bodner, Antitrust Policy in Distribution:The Expanded Prohibitions Against Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing: The Search
for a Viable Legal Alternative, 37 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 759 (1968); Smith, Vertical
Arrangements, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 18 (1963); Stoll, Exclusive Dealing Arrangements and the Antitrust Law, 6 WILLIAMEITE L.J. 17 (1970).
Section 3 also requires that the integrating firm, the seller, be engaged in interstate
commerce and that the products in question be wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities for use, consumption, or resale. These requirements
are rarely litigated and are beyond the scope of this Comment.
8. The phrase "private parties injured as a result of" will be used in the early
portions of this Comment to encompass anyone in the chain of causation. It will be
shown later that damages are limited to those whose injury was "proximately"
caused by defendant's violation. See pt. II. B. 2. infra.
9. Section 4 provides in part: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court ••• without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fees." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) [hereinafter § 4].
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lems in the federal antitrust Iaws.10 An example of the difficulties
in this area is Allied Equipment Company v. Weber Engineered
Products, lncorporated. 11
Allied Equipment Company (Allied), the plaintiff, was granted
an exclusive distributorship in the farm equipment of Weber Engineered Products, Incorporated (Weber) for a large portion of Virginia, and between 1949 and 1953, Allied handled such products
exclusively. During this period, relying upon an anticipated continuation of the business relationship, Allied incurred considerable
expense in expanding wholesale facilities and establishing retail
outlets for Weber equipment. In 1953, Allied notified Weber that
it planned to handle competing lines _in the future. Weber
threatened to cancel the distributorship if such a plan were effectuated; when Allied refused to give up its intentions, "'\,Veber canceled
the contract. Alleging that it had suffered damages because of an
exclusive-dealing policy rendered illegal by section 3 of the Clayton
Act, Allied brought a section 4 action. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, however, declined to recognize a valid claim for
which relief could be granted:
Allied faces a dilemma on the point. If there was no contract denying it the right to handle products competitive to Weber, there was
no violation of the antitrust laws. If there was such a contract, as
we have already pointed out the breach was by Allied and so no
damages accrued to it.12

Taken literally, the language of the court of appeals effectively denies a cause of action to any dealer injured by a violation of section 3.
Although an extreme example, the Allied decision fairly represents the unsympathetic treatment generally accorded dealers-particularly terminated dealers-in the area of exclusive dealing. 13
While the excerpt from Allied stated that there must be a contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant in order for there to be a
IO. Kessler & Stern, supra note 1, at 21. The confusion has had important effects in
other areas of the law. See, e.g., Macaulay, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal with It: Automobile Manufacturers,
Their Dealers and the Legal System, 1965 WIS. L. R.Ev. 483. In discussing the inequities that exist between small dealers and large manufacturers wielding coercive
economic power, Professor Macaulay alludes to the fact that the use of private antitrust litigation to prevent such practices has met with little success. Id. at 506 n.70.
Presumably, if private antitrust machinery could be utilized successfully, detailed and
time-consuming efforts in other parts of the legal system would be unnecessary.
11. 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956).
12. 237 F.2d at 883.
13. See, e.g., Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Nelson Radio &: Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.,
200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). The Nelson case is
discussed in pt. II. B. I. infra.
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violation of section 3, the court failed to specify precisely what led
it to find such a requirement. It is the purpose of this Comment to
re-examine two of the three requirements14 of section 3 of the Clayton Act-with particular emphasis on the sale-or-contract-for-sale
requirement-in an attempt to determine whether the formidable
obstacle that judicial interpretation has made of these requirements
is consistent with either the letter or spirit of the section. In discussing these requirements, this Comment will only consider the rights
of parties who have at one time made purchases from a seller who
utilizes exclusive-selling arrangements.

II.

REQUIREMENT OF A SALE OR CONTRACT FOR SALE

In order to state a cause of action based on section 3 of the Clayton Act, a plaintiff must first allege that there has been a sale or
contract for sale. In examining this requirement, it is useful to divide dealers who have been injured by exposure to exclusive-dealing
arrangements into three categories according to the nature of the
damages they seek. The first category consists of those dealers who
at one time agreed to deal exclusively and who subsequently sue for
the damages they incurred during the period of the illegal arrangement. The second category includes those dealers who refused to
purchase the seller's products exclusively and were subsequently exposed to the refusal-to-deal sanction for such conduct; these dealers
allege damages resulting from their terminations. Finally, there is a
hybrid group of dealers who qualify under both of the above categories and who seek damages for both acts of the seller. The cause
of action in this third category is best considered in its component
parts, although some problems peculiar to such a hybrid suit will
be discussed separately. 15 Since the rights of a dealer seeking damages resulting from his exclusive contract with a defendant-seller are
relatively clear, that category will be considered only briefly and the
bulk of analysis will focus on the more confusing area involving the
terminated dealer.16
14 The requirements are stated in text at notes 5-7 supra. The third, or economic,
test is beyond the scope of this work. For a discussion of it, see note 7 supra and
sources cited therein.
15. See notes 21-27 infra and accompanying text.
16. Competitors of the seller may also sue under § 4 for damage resulting from
exclusive-dealing arrangements. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Although such suits are rare,
the authority that exists seems clearly to establish the validity of a cause of action in
these circumstances. See, e.g., McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d
332 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1960). Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil
Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955). Although a plaintiff-competitor faces the same
§ 3 and § 4 requirements as the terminated dealer, the competitor is in a somewhat
better position because he alleges damage resulting from an existing contract or contracts between the defendant and distributors; the refused dealer, on the other hand,
must argue that his injury resulted from a termination that was related to a system
of exclusive-dealing agreements. See pt. II. B. 2. infra. Thus, the competitor faces only
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A. Dealer Who Sues for Damages Incurred During Period
of Exclusive-Dealing Arrangement with the Defendant
The dealer who at some point in time acquiesced in the seller's
unlawful scheme would appear to meet the requirements of section 3 since he seeks damages resulting from a contract or sale that
was on the condition, agreement, or understanding that he deal exclusively in the seller's products. Such dealers can be divided into
two groups. The first group offers the clearest example of a plaintiff
who is obviously entitled to sue-a dealer who continues to adhere to
the illegal sale agreement at the time of the suit. Not surprisingly,
few dealers have been willing to institute proceedings under such
circumstances. The scarcity of such suits may be attributed to a
number of factors. For example, the integrated dealer may be satisfied with the arrangement. Or he may feel that, although not necessarily satisfied, he has suffered relatively little damage as a result of
the agreement and that a lawsuit would therefore be economically
infeasible. Finally, he may feel, though probably without cause, that
a lawsuit would be barred by the seller's defense of in pari delicto.11
evidentiary problems in establishing a contract or sale on condition, agreement, or un•
derstanding. See note 18 infra. His principal difficulty lies in establishing proximate
cause. The policy arguments that favor granting the refused dealer a cause of action,
considered in text accompanying notes 61-87 infra, are generally applicable to the com•
petitor as well.
Direct support for a competitor's cause of action under §§ 3 and 4 of the Clayton
Act is found in the Karseal case, supra. Plaintiff Karseal was a manufacturer of an
automobile wax known as "Wax Seal." Richfield was a producer of petroleum
products distributed to a large number of dealers along with other automotive parts
and accessories. Prior to this suit, Richfield had been found guilty of violating § 3
through the use of exclusive-dealing and tying arrangements in a suit brought by
the Justice Department. United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.
Cal. 1951), afjd. per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). The plaintiff brought this suit for
damages to his business resulting from one of the terms of the illegal agreements
that prohibited dealers in Richfield products from purchasing automobile wax from
competitors. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated the precise issue to be
"whether Karseal's business is 'within that area of the economy which is endangered
by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry.'" 221 F.2d at 362.
The court first found that the gist of the violation was the restriction on the sale of
competitive products. It then applied the target area theory of causation, discussed in
notes 58-60 infra and accompanying text, and found that a competitor of the excluding manufacturer was not only hit but also specifically aimed at by the illegal
conduct. 221 F .2d at 365.
17. The defense of in pari delicto has been considerably limited in antitrust suits.
See Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 390 U.S. 1891 (1967);
Banana Distrib. Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (collect•
ing authorities); Recent Development, 53 MINN. L. REv. 827 (1969); Recent Develop•
ment, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 322 (1969). The courts have frequently disallowed the de•
fense when it appears that the parties were not equally at fault. See, e.g., Harriman
v. Northern Sec. Co., 197 U.S. 244 (1905) (seller used coercive tactics); Ring v. Spina,
148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945) (economic coercion); Lehmann Trading Corp. v. J & H
Stolow, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (seller used coercive tactics); Red Rock
Bottlers, Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1953 Trade Cas. 68,856 (N.D. Ga.), revd. on other
grounds, 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952) (one party appeared to have benefited more by
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Nevertheless, those plaintiffs who have brought suit while dealing
exclusively have easily fulfilled the procedural requirement18 of
pleading a successful claim, since the contract required by section 3
is still in existence for all to observe. 19
For similar reasons, it would appear that a dealer in the second
group-one who temporarily acquiesced in an exclusive-dealing arrangement and who, after changing his mind and refusing to continue to deal only with the seller, was subjected to the refusal-todeal sanction-would also have a valid claim at least with respect to
damages incurred during the period of the agreement's operation.20
In this respect, he is in the same position as the dealer who is still
engaged in such operations at the time of suit,21 hence some courts
have recognized valid causes of action under these circumstances.22
However, other courts have refused to allow such a claim, either because of a failure to distinguish between the two separable portions
the illegal arrangement than the other party). The following statement from Ring
is especially appropriate here:
But here even without a showing of economic coercion ••• plaintiff is precisely
the type of individual whom the Sherman Act seeks to protect from combinations fashioned by others and offered to such individual as the only feasible
method by which he may do business. Considerations of public policy demand
court intervention in behalf of such person, even if technically he could be
considered in pari delicto.
148 F .2d at 653.
18. Throughout this Comment the "procedural requirement" will refer to the requirement that there be a sale or contract for sale in order to establish a cause of
action under § 3 of the Clayton Act; the "substantive requirement" will refer to the
necessity that there be a condition, agreement, or understanding. These terms have
been selected because they best characterize the current plight of the refused dealer.
Almost uniformly, failure to show the requisite contract or sale has resulted in the
dismissal of a plaintiff's case at the directed-verdict stage. See, e.g., Nelson Radio &:
Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925
(1953), discussed in pt. II. B. 1. infra. Thus, this requirement is labeled "procedural."
Failure to show the existence of a condition, agreement, or understanding, on the
other hand, is generally considered a failure of proof, resulting in a verdict for the
defendant. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. FTC, 299 F.2d 839 (6th Cir.
1962) (discussed in text accompanying notes 119-20 infra). Thus, this element is
more analogous to a substantive requirement.
19. See, e.g., Libman v. Sun Oil Co., 127 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1954) (requirements
contract); Red Rock Bottlers, Inc. v. Red Rock Cola Co., 1953 Trade Cas. 68,856 (N.D.
Ga.), revd. on other grounds, 195 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1952) (exclusive-dealing and tying
contracts).
20. See Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamms Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir.
1968); Lessig v. Tidewater, 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964);
McElhenney v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 834 (1960); Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 (D.
Md. 1962). But cf. Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Engineered Prod., 237 F.2d 879 (4th
Cir. 1956); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 821 (1954).
21. There is, however, a four-year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964).
See also notes 51-53 infra and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater, 327 F.2d 454 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 993 (1964); McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1960).
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of the claim or because of an apparent general animosity toward
such suits. The decision in Allied Equipment Company v. Weber
Engineered Products, 23 considered earlier, exemplifies both deficiencies.24 Although the plaintiff in Allied claimed damage both before
and after the termination, the court failed to discuss the two claims
independently; it merely stated tersely that the plaintiff had no
claim under any circumstances.25 Another court strictly interpreted
imprecise pleadings in denying a terminated dealer's claim. Campbell Distributing Company v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Company 26 involved facts similar to those in Allied-the plaintiff claimed that it
had purchased beer exclusively from the defendant for over twenty
years but was refused further purchases when it announced that it
would no longer deal exclusively. The plaintiff alleged that it was
injured as a result of the termination but failed to expand on the
issue whether it had been damaged by the exclusive dealing for
twenty years. Rather than examine the pleadings in an attempt to
determine whether any claim had been presented by the facts alleged-in accordance with generally accepted procedure27-or grant
the plaintiff leave to amend, the court granted summary judgment
for the defendant on the ground that a mere refusal to deal does
not violate section 3.28
Despite cases like Allied and Campbell, the sounder approach
suggests that a dealer who once operated under an exclusive-dealing
agreement but who has subsequently been canceled should at least
have a valid claim with respect to damages incurred during the period of exclusive dealings. The mere fact that he was precluded
from dealing with others during this period should provide sufficient proof of the fact of damage to defeat a motion for a directed
verdict and allow the dealer to present the substance of his claim.
23. 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1956). See discussion in text accompanying notes 11 &: 12
supra.
24. See also Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 821 (1954).
25. See text at note 12 supra.
26. 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1962).
27. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) ("[S]ummary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive
and intent play leading roles • • • and hostile witnesses thicken the plot''); Conely
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439, 443
(8th Cir. 1964) ("[A] charge of antitrust violation, with daim of business injury therefrom, should generally be afforded the opportunity for proof to be made thereon,
because of the aspect of public interest involved. Only where it is legally certain that
the acts charged, in their rational implications, are incapable of constituting a violation
of the antitrust laws [should the daim be dismissed]"); Clausen &: Sons, Inc. v. Theo.
Hamms Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148, 153 (D.C. Minn. 1967) ("The general rule is
that a claim should not be dismissed for insufficiency of statement unless it appears to
a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts
which could be proven in support of the claim'').
28. 208 F. Supp. at 527.
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In fact, most courts have been willing to recognize such a claim, and
more recent cases indicate a marked trend in favor of the dealer.29
There is a more subtle factor, however, that may influence the outcome of such hybrid suits: a dealer in this situation may have incurred a substantial portion of his damages as a result of the refusalto-deal sanction and therefore may fail to impress upon the court
the significance of the minimal damages incurred as a result of a
previously existing arrangement. The possibility that the harm
caused by the termination may substantially exceed the harm caused
by the exclusive agreement demonstrates the importance of determining whether the refused dealer has a valid claim for damages
resulting from cancellation.
B. Dealer Who Sues for Damages Resulting from Termination
for Failure To Consent to Exclusive-Dealing Arrangement

I. The Nelson Case
Courts have been reluctant to recognize valid causes of action
for terminations for refusals to accede to exclusive arrangements.
This reluctance is most clearly illustrated by the leading case of
Nelson Radio b Supply Company v. Motorola, Incorporated. 3° For
several years prior to 1948, Nelson had been engaged in distributing
Motorola products. During that year, Motorola submitted a wholesale distributor's contract to Nelson that required it to stop selling
the products of any Motorola competitors; Motorola threatened to
terminate the present contract and to refuse to make a new one if
Nelson did not agree to the exclusive arrangement. Nelson, however, resisted these demands and, in 1949, Motorola terminated
dealings with it. Nelson then sued under the provisions of section 331 and alleged, inter alia, that Motorola had entered into
agreements substantially similar to the one presented to Nelson
with its other distributors throughout the United States; that had
Nelson consented to these demands, it would have violated the antitrust laws; and that it was injured as a result of such actions. Nelson
never enjoyed the opportunity of presenting the substance of its
claim because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a split decision,
held that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action. 32 In
29. See, e.g., cases cited in note 22 supra.
!10. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
31. Plaintiff sued, alternatively, under § l of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1964). For the requirements for a cause of action under that provision, see pt. IV

infra.
!12. The dissenting opinion of Rives, C.J., is instructive not only as a strong
criticism of the court's action, but also as a premonition of future § 3 actions:
Taking the averments to be true, as we must on motion to dismiss, a scheme
has been devised by defendant's agents under which its dealers throughout the
country have been coerced into entering into contracts in restraint of trade and
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reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that section 3 prohibited contracts or sales on condition, agreement, or understanding.
In the court's opinion, a dealer who had been subjected to the
refusal-to-deal sanction had not been involved in a contract or sale
within the meaning of section 3. Moreover, the allegation that defendant had entered similar arrangements with other distributors
was of no relevance because, according to the court's interpretation
of section 4, there was no proximate cause between such a course of
conduct and plaintiff's injuries:
[I]t is obvious that any injury to plaintiff's business is in no way the
result of any agreements restricting distributors in other territories.
That is to say, it is the absence of a contract with the plaintiff, not
the presence of agreements with distributors in other parts of the
country, of which the plaintiff must complain.33

Nelson unfittingly became an important precedent for refusing
causes of action to terminated dealers.34 Few courts were willing
to challenge the reasoning in the opinion or to examine the case's
somewhat unusual fact situation. Thus, the requirement that there
be a sale or contract for sale proved to be a significant procedural
barrier for private plaintiffs, and few suits reached the stage where
it was necessary to prove the second, evidentiary portion of the section 3 test-a condition, agreement or understanding. 35 Thus, it is
clear that the sale-or-contract-for-sale requirement lies at the heart
of the refused dealer's problem. Courts have frequently directed a
verdict for the defendant, based upon an assertion that the sale-orcontract-for-sale requirement was not fulfilled, while failing to articulate their precise reason for so doing. As the Nelson opinion indicates, there are two overlapping grounds on which such a decision
can be based. On the one hand, a court may imply an additional
in clear violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act•••• The plaintiff refused to be
so coerced with resulting cancellation of its franchise and destruction of its
business. Yet the court now holds the plaintiff is remediless•••• At long last a
method has been found to flout the purposes of the antitrust laws and to deny
the victims any recourse to the courts. I cannot agree. • • • In short, I think if
we apply to the amended complaint the rule of reason rather than the rule of
form, it is entirely sufficient."
200 F.2d at 916. An expression of similar concern with the results of the majority's
holding appears in Kessler &: Stern, supra note I, at 84-85: "The Nelson decision
raises grave problems of public policy. According to the interpretation of the antitrust laws adopted by the court, a refusal to deal with a dealer who has not acceded
to the request for exclusivity is not actionable, even if it is a means of controlling
a system of exclusive dealing which has anticompetitive effects."
33. 200 F.2d at 915.
34. See, e.g., Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523
(D. Md. 1962); Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Engineered Prods., Inc., 237 F.2d 879 (4th
Cir. 1956).
35. See note 18 supra.
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requirement into section 3-that the sale or contract for sale must
be between the plaintiff and the defendant. Thus, under this theory, the terminated plaintiff cannot plead a valid cause of action
because he has not dealt with the defendant during the time period
for which he seeks damages. However, such an implication is inconsistent with both the letter-which requires merely "a sale or contract for sale" and not a sale or contract for sale involving the plaintiff-and spirit of section 3.36 Conversely, a court may interpret section 4 of the Clayton Act, which enables private plaintiffs to bring
treble-damage actions, as requiring a causal relationship-i.e., a
dealer can only be proximately harmed by a violation of section 3 if
he was a party to a prohibited sale or contract for sale-that cannot
possibly embrace the terminated dealer. The second interpretation is
frequently difficult to distinguish from the first, since both focus
upon the sale-or-contract-for-sale issue. Under the second interpretation, it is not relevant that the defendant is currently selling to
other dealers on an exclusive basis and that the plaintiff was terminated for his refusal to join the arrangement because, as a matter of
law, contracts with other dealers cannot proximately cause damage
to the plaintiff.
If this latter issue is the true basis on which courts have denied
causes of action to terminated dealers-and, indeed, it would appear
to be more sensible to address the issue as one of causation37-new
concepts of proximate cause that have been developed in other areas
of antitrust law should be examined. Moreover, useful analogies can
be drawn from Sherman Act cases, because section 4 of the Clayton
Act applies to both the Sherman and Clayton Acts.38 Thus, cases in
which dealers sued for damages resulting from termination for failure to abide by resale price maintenance schemes39 or other arrangements in violation of section I of the Sherman Act40 should serve as
!16. For a discussion of the "spirit" of § l!, see pt. II. B. 3. a. infra.
37. The Nelson court ultimately based its decision on causation. In dismissing the
§ !I complaint, the court said, "The plaintiff has not been injured as a result of a contract, either express or implied, which sought to prevent him from dealing in the
goods of any competitor of the defendant." 200 F.2d at 916 (emphasis added).
!18. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in part: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor in any district court ••••" 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (emphasis added).
!19. Resale price maintenance schemes-which involve agreements whereby retailers
or wholesalers are bound to observe resale prices fixed by the manufacturer-are illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). See, e.g., United States v.
Parke, Davis Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
40. Section I of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal • • • ."
15 U.S.C. § I (1964). The possibility of suit under the monopoly provisions of § 2
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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forceful precedent for the exclusive-dealing situation, since plaintiffs
in both situations should face an identical section 4 proximate-cause
requirement.

2. Proximate Cause
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes private antitrust
suits and provides for treble damages to injured parties,41 has been
interpreted as imposing a rather significant barrier for private litigants in the form of a threefold test. Although the section literally
requires merely that the plaintiff "be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws," 42
the courts have interpreted this language to include a rather stringent proximate-cause requirement in addition to the obvious requirements that there be a violation of the antitrust laws and that
the plaintiff be injured. 43 The effect of such an interpretation was
apparent in Nelson, which appears to be the first case in the area of
exclusive dealing in which a court was willing to direct a verdict on
the grounds that a plaintiff had failed to allege a sufficient causal relationship between the violation by the defendant and the injury to
the plaintiff.44
The decision that an injury is or is not proximately caused merely
represents a conclusion that the plaintiff should not be covered by the
statute; stated another way, it involves a decision to break a possibly
infinite chain of causation at some point.45 Therefore, it is more ap41. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). Private litigants are also empowered to sue for an
injunction against violations of the antitrust laws pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), but such an action would be, in a practical sense, of little
value to the dealer in the situation under discussion. If the potential plaintiff is
currently dealing exclusively with one seller, he is unlikely to sue, because he fears
economic reprisal, because he has suffered little actual damage to date, or because he
is satisfied with the arrangement. I£ the dealer has already been terminated for
failure to cooperate in such a scheme, an injunction will not remedy that termination.
42. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (emphasis added).
43. The following discussion is limited to the problem of alleging a sufficient causal
connection between the alleged injury and the violation in order to establish a claim.
To recover, a private litigant suing under the provisions of § 4 must also, however,
prove pecuniary injury "in fact" to his business or property. See Pollack, Standing To
Sue, Remoteness of Injury and the Passing on Doctrine, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 5,
6-7 (1966).
44. Although Nelson appears to have been the first case in which a court delineated
the relationship of proximate cause in § 3 violations, the proximate-cause requirement
for private litigants suing pursuant to § 4 had existed for over sixty years. See Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); Ames v. American Tel. &: Tel.
Co., 166 F. 820 (D. Mass. 1909). The requirement has been variously characterized as "proximate cause" and as "standing to sue." See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 43;
Note, Standing To Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
45. See L. GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 122-23 (1927); w. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 41, at 240-41 (3d ed. 1964); Cohen, Field Theory and
Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 251-59 (1950); Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L.
R.Ev. 211, 343-52 (1924).
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propriate to address the issue in terms of the policies underlying
sections 3 and 4, rather than discussing the "closeness" or "remoteness" of an injury. 46 Such an approach is particularly appropriate
in the case of section 4, which speaks of causation in extremely
broad terms. 47 By imposing a stringent interpretation of cause,
thereby eliminating the refused dealer as a plaintiff, the Nelson
court implied an additional requirement into section 3 that severely
limits that provision's scope.
It is unfitting that the analysis of proximate cause in the Nelson
case has continued to have great judicial weight. For neither the
Nelson decision nor many of the decisions that followed it have
taken account of the elaborate body of law that has recently developed concerning proximate cause in the area of antitrust law. 48
Moreover, the pleadings in the Nelson case were unusual, and the
decision may be distinguished from similar cases. The court appeared to rely heavily on the broad language of the pleadings and
the fact situation it seemed to represent. In trying to establish a
causal connection between Motorola's over-all policy of exclusive
dealing and the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff, according to the
court, merely alleged "that the defendant is selling and shipping
Motorola merchandise to its other distributors throughout the
United States under distributor agreements substantially the
same" 49 as the one that the defendant attempted to impose on the
plaintiff. In response to this allegation, the court stated that "it is
obvious that any injury to plaintiff's business is in no way the result
of any agreements restricting distributors in other territories." 50
Thus, it is possible that the indiscriminate wording of the complaint and the failure of the plaintiff to define more precisely the
relationship between other dealers and itself led the court to the
conclusion that there was no cause of action presented.
46. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 283 (3d ed. 1964); Note,
Proximate Cause as a Limitation on the Scope of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 44
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 160, 161 (1966).
47. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ••• .'' 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964)
(emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
377 U.S. 13 (1964).
It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss proximate cause, as it relates to
antitrust law, in depth. It will only be considered to the extent applicable to exclusive dealing. For a more detailed analysis, see generally E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL
TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS §§ 4.01-.ll, 20.01-.06 (1965); Pollack, The "Injury"
and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U. L. R.Ev.
691 (1963); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in
Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 231 (1961);
Comment, Legal Cause in Treble Damage Actions Under the Clayton Act, 27 MD. L.
R.Ev. 275 (1967).
49. 200 F.2d 9II, 913 (5th Cir. 1952) (emphasis added).
50. 200 F.2d at 915 (emphasis added).

Il52

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69:1140

Since the result in Nelson may be at least partially attributable
to the plaintiff's defective pleading, it would be worthwhile to take
a fresh look at the proximate-cause issue. Theoretically, cause
should be relatively easy to establish in section 3 actions brought
by terminated dealers. Consider a situation in which a plaintiff and
three other dealers compete in the distribution of XYZ products in
a market area that is highly profitable to XYZ Company. Each of
the four dealers derives approximately seventy-five per cent of his
profits from the distribution of XYZ products and twenty-five per
cent from the distribution of products of a competitor of XYZ. Each
of the plaintiff's three competitors then accedes to XYZ's demands
to enter into exclusive-dealing arrangements, and XYZ threatens to
terminate the plaintiff if he does not also acquiesce. The plaintiff is
left with two choices: he may agree to the plan and lose the twentyfive per cent of his profits that is attributable to sales of non-XYZ
products, or he may refuse to enter into the arrangement and
thereby lose the seventy-five per cent of his profits that is attributable to sales of XYZ products. Thus, he is injured, in fact, by either
alternative to the extent of lost profits.51 Proving proximate causethat the injury to the plaintiff is proximately caused by the defendant's violation of section 3-requires only one additional conceptual step. Consider a hypothetical case similar to the one above, in
which XYZ has four distributors of roughly equal size and seventyfive per cent of each distributor's sales consists of XYZ products.
Dealer A is unlikely to be swayed by XYZ's threats of refusal to deal
as long as dealers B, C, and D have not acceded, since he realizes
that XYZ would lose one-fourth of its sales if it canceled A. For the
same reason, XYZ is unlikely to cancel A. If B agrees to deal exclusively, however, it becomes more feasible for XYZ to threaten and
cancel A, because B's increased efforts in handling XYZ's products
will partially offset the losses incurred if A is terminated. ·when C
and D acquiesce, XYZ will not hesitate to refuse to deal with A because the combined efforts of B, C, and D will probably make up
for the lost sales formerly made by A. Thus, the sales or contracts to
sell to other dealers directly harm the refused dealer, because they
make it feasible for the seller to impose the refusal-to-deal sanction,
which deprives the refused dealer of a large share of his profits.
Passing from the realm of simple hypotheticals to the real economy
does not alter the basic argument. It is not A's knowledge of XYZ's
exclusive-dealing agreements with other distributors that is impor51. It is realistic to assume that in either situation, by stocking more inventory,
specializing in fewer products, using more intensive advertising, etc., the dealer could
increase sales of the products he is still selling above the level that prevailed for
each item when he was handling several lines. However, it is unlikely that he could
increase his total sales to the previous level, and even if he could, his profit level might
be much less than previously.
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tant: 112 the mere existence of such agreements gives XYZ the economic leverage to threaten to cancel and ultimately to cancel A
without inflicting substantial damage on itself. In sum, it can be
seen that the harm resulting from a dealer's termination for refusing to accede to an exclusive-dealing arrangement is causally related to the seller's violation of section 3 by entering into exclusive
agreements with other dealers.
That there is a close relationship between the terminated dealer's injury and the seller's section 3 violation is supported by a recent
decision in a related area of antitrust law, in which the Supreme
Court was willing to interpret the proximate-cause requirement of
section 4 in a manner favorable to the refused dealer. In Simpson v.
Union Oil Company, 53 the plaintiff contended that he had been
terminated by Union Oil for failure to abide by a resale price maintenance system abhorrent to section I of the Sherman Act,114 that
leases and agreements that were conditioned upon the dealer's adherence to a price-fixing scheme were currently utilized by the defendant in its arrangements with numerous other dealers, and that
the plaintiff was harmed as a result of his cancellation for refusal to
adhere to the illegal arrangement. In reversing summary judgment
granted for the defendant, the Court had little trouble finding proximate cause:
If the ... agreement achieves resale price maintenance in violation
of the Sherman Act, it and the lease are being used to injure interstate commerce by depriving independent dealers of the exercise of free judgment.... The fact that a retailer can refuse to deal
does not give the supplier immunity if the arrangement is one of
those schemes condemned by the antitrust laws. There is actionable
wrong whenever the restraint of trade or monopolistic practice has
an impact on the market; and it matters not that the complainant
may be only one merchant. 511
52. Indeed, the fact that knowledge is unimportant in the real world may easily
be demonstrated by examining the classic model of the Prisoner's Dilemma. X and Y
commit a crime to which there are no known witnesses. Immediately afterward they
are captured and placed in two separate rooms. The district attorney tells X that if
he confesses and thereby implicates Y, he will get a short sentence. However, if he
does not confess but Y does, then Y will get the short sentence and X the long one. X
now faces the dilemma. He knows that both he and Y will go free if neither confesses.
He also knows, however, that the risk of silence is great, for if he refuses to confess but
Y breaks down, he will get the worst possible sentence. X has no choice but to confess on the assumption that Y will confess, thereby minimizing his risk. The dealer
offered an exclusive-dealing contract is in much the same position. He must assume
that other dealers have acquiesced-unless the seller deals with so few buyers that
the dealer can actually confirm his assumptions. Thus, the seller's threat is a viable
one, and, for purposes of the effect on any one dealer, knowledge should be an unnecessary ingredient of a terminated dealer's § 3 action.
53. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
54. See note 39 supra.
55. 377 U.S. at 16.
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It is thus clear that at least in the Sherman Act context of resale
price maintenance, the Court will recognize a cause of action for a
terminated dealer when the dealer alleges that his cancellation was
part of a broader scheme designed to violate the antitrust laws.
Since section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private cause of action
for injuries caused "by reason of anything forbidden by the antitrust laws," the same proximate-cause requirement should be applied to section I of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton
Act. Therefore, the Simpson analysis should enable a dealer terminated for refusing to accede to an exclusive-dealing arrangement to
state a valid cause of action under section 3.
Traditionally, when faced with a proximate-cause question in
antitrust cases, the courts have used the "direct-indirect" test, which
requires the plaintiff's injury to be the direct result of the defendant's violation rather than merely the indirect result of an injury
to a third party.56 But since this test does no more than substitute
"direct" for "proximate," it fails to simplify the inquiry. 57 Because
they regard the direct-indirect test as unsatisfactory, some courts
have developed the "target area" test, which requires that a plaintiff
be within the general target area at which the seller aimed his violation.58 Application of the target area test to a section 3 complaint
by a terminated dealer might enable the dealer to plead a successful
cause of action. The test in this context would involve a twofold
inquiry. A court would first determine whether the harm to the
plaintiff was of the type the relevant statute was designed to protect:
in making this determination, the court would examine only the
particular segment of the economy in which the exclusive-dealing
arrangements exist. The second stage of the inquiry would involve
an examination of the plaintiff's relationship with that segment in
order to determine whether he was within the category of parties
toward whom the violation was aimed. 59 A refused dealer who alleges injury resulting from termination of his dealership as part of a
series of successful exclusive-dealing contracts obviously would fulfill the first requirement of the test concerning the type of harm
that the statute was designed to prevent.60 Moreover, by terminat56. See, e.g., Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958);
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
57. See Note, supra note 46, at 165.
58. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955);
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 919 (1952); Pollack, supra note 43, at 18 (listing authority).
59. Note, supra note 46, at 165. In Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d
358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955), the court likened the test to a target: "Assuming Karseal
[plaintiff] was 'hit' by the effect of the Richfield antitrust violations, was Karseal
'aimed at' with enough precision to entitle it to maintain a treble damage suit under
the Clayton Act?" See also Recent Development, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 543 (1956).
60. A. NEALE, THE .ANnTRuST LAws OF THE U.S.A. 178-80 (2d ed. 1970).
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ing dealers as a method of coercing others to comply with a policy
of exclusive dealing, the seller has aimed his section 3 violations, in
a very direct manner, at the refused dealer and thus has fulfilled the
second portion of the test.
In reviewing the proximate-cause issue, it is clear that a terminated dealer's injury is causally related to a seller's violation of the
exclusive-dealing prohibition in section 3 of the Clayton Act. The
Supreme Court has recognized a similar causal relationship between
a dealer's injury resulting from his termination for refusing to go
along with a resale price maintenance scheme and a seller's illegal
price maintenance arrangements with other dealers. Moreover, application of the target area test establishes the proximity between a
terminated dealer's injury and a seller's illegal exclusive-dealing
agreements with other dealers. It would therefore seem that unless
a private cause of action under section 3 for terminated dealers is
inconsistent with the antitrust-law policy, such a cause of action
should be readily allowed.

3. A New Analysis
a. Policy Considerations. The target area test has thus far been
ignored in the area of exclusive dealing in favor of a more vague
proximate-cause standard. As a result, terminated dealers have been
unable to maintain successful causes of action under section 3 of the
Clayton Act. Because proximate cause is essentially a conclusory
term used to justify a break made in the chain of causation for policy reasons, 61 the policies that relate to granting a cause of action to
refused dealers should be carefully examined.
Section 4B of the Clayton Act contains a four-year statute of
limitations for actions brought under section 4 of the Act. 62 A
plaintiff in the position of Campbell Distributing Company, who
had engaged in exclusive dealing for a long period of time prior to
cancellation,63 loses a significant portion of his claim for damages
unless he is willing and able to bring suit every four years. It has
also been observed that several factors tend to deter a party to an
exclusive-dealing agreement from suing during the course of the
contract. 64 However, section 3 of the Clayton Act deals specifically
with the practice of exclusive dealing and indicates a strong congressional policy against such activity. It is therefore submitted that in
order to effectuate this policy fully and to maximize the in terrorem
enforcement effects of the section 4 treble-damage provision, a private litigant suing under section 3 should be able to seek redress for
61. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
62, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964).

63. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
64. See text preceding note 17 supra.
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future damages resulting from his termination as well as for past
damages incurred during the course of his dealing with the defendant.
The same policies that prompted adoption of a treble-damage
remedy compel a broad interpretation of section 3. Section 4 was
designed to provide for treble rather than single damages in order
to induce private action and to make such suits a viable deterrent
to violation of the antitrust laws.65 The courts have recognized such
a policy66 and scholars have encouraged it.67 Moreover, the reasons
for encouraging private litigation are convincing. First, government
activity has long been hamstrung by insufficient funds and personnel. 68 It has been estimated that it would require an increase of appropriations to the antitrust divisions of the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of over four times their
current budgets to equal the prevailing enforcement effectiveness
of private litigants.69 In addition, private action· has the advantage
of involving highly interested and well-informed persons in the government's enforcement efforts; such participation is particularly important when evidentiary burdens are likely to be extreme.7° Finally, while private enforcement has a deterrent effect that is likely
to be substantial when compared to that of government actions,
which result in relatively small fines 71 and, at times, ineffective in65. A. NEALE, supra note 60, at 396.
66. For example, the Supreme Court, in Radovich v. National Football League, 352
U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957), stated: "Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined that such
prohibited activities are injurious to the public and has provided sanctions allowing
private enforcement of the antitrust laws by an aggrieved party. These laws protect
the victims of the forbidden practises as well as the public." See also Fanchon &:
Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, 100 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D. Cal. 1951), afld., 215 F.2d
167 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955), in which a district court said:
"The treble-damage action was intended not merely to redress injury to an individual
through the prohibited practices, but to aid in achieving the broad social object of the
statute." More specifically, the treble recovery was designed to encourage private plaintiffs to bring suit, Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947);
to threaten potential violators with punitive damages, Fanchon & Marco, supra; and to
compensate those who have been injured by violations, Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied per curiam, 337 F.2d
844 (2d Cir. 1964).
67. See, e.g., Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 .ANnTRUST BULL. 167 (1958); Note, supra note 46. But cf. McConnell, The Treble Damage
Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50 Nw. U. L. REv. 342 (1955).
68. Antitrust Law Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division, Department of Justice, H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51, 75-76
(1951); Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952).
69. Testimony of Graham H. Morison (former assistant Attorney General in charge
of the antitrust division), Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 3408, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1951).
70. Kessler &: Stern, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J.
1, 81 (1959).
71. Loevinger, supra note 67, at 168-69.
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junctions,72 private actions also aim partially at repairing the plaintiff's injury.
In light of such compelling factors, 73 it is particularly anomalous
that the narrow judicial interpretation typically given section 3 results in a great disparity between the causes of action available to
the private plaintiff and the public plaintiff. Both the Justice Department74 and the FTC75 have realized a great degree of success in
suits brought to enjoin the continuation of exclusive-dealing arrangements.
Thus, in United States v. Sun Oil Company,76 under circum72, See, e.g., United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951),
affd, per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). In that case, after the court issued an injunction
that prohibited exclusive dealing, the defendant increased the rent on its service
stations while simultaneously lowering the price of its gas to distributors. As a
result, dealers were effectively forced to purchase their full requirements of gasoline
from the defendant. For an example of an equally anomalous result, see Dart Drug
Corp. v. Parke, Davis&: Co., 344 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1965). After the Justice Department
had successfully prosecuted Parke, Davis for an illegal resale price maintenance system, United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), Dart Drug brought an
action for treble damages alleging injury as a result of the refusal-to-deal sanction
when it failed to acquiesce in Parke, Davis' scheme. The court of appeals held that
Dart Drug did not have a cause of action because the defendant had merely exercised
its right unilaterally to refuse to deal.
73. The policy considerations that favor a liberal interpretation of the statutes
involved have often been countered with opposing policies. Some of the most common arguments are the danger of a flood of litigation (see Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910)); the drastic nature of the remedy itself (see Image &:
Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1956)); the
burden that might be placed on industries particularly susceptible to such actions
(Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affd.,
211 F.2d 405 (!!d Cir.), cert. denied, !!48 U.S. 828 (1954)); and the possibility that
a defendant will merely pass the cost of such recoveries on to the consumer. For a
general discussion of the competing policy factors, see E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE
DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS §§ !!.01-.02 (1965); Alioto, The Economics of a Treble
Damage Case, !!2 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 87 (1966); Loevinger, Handling a Plaintiff's
Antitrust Damage Suit, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 29 (1959).
74. Under § 14 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964), the Justice Department
has the power to sue for injunctive relief against violations of § 3. The United States
is also granted power through § 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964), to enjoin similar practices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
Moreover, fine and imprisonment can be levied under § 1 of the Sherman Act and
§ 14 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
75. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) possesses a particularly potent weapon
in § 5 of the Federal Trade Comlnission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), because no contract to sell on condition, agreement, or understanding is required to establish a
violation of that provision. Although § 5 merely requires proof of unfair methods of
competition in order to establish a violation, it is directly analogous to § 3 cases
because of the "incipiency doctrine" under which the courts have found § 5 to embrace the Sherman and Clayton Acts and hence to require proof identical to that
necessary in those two acts. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S.
!!92 (1953). But cf. Kessler &: Stern, supra note 70, at 63, suggesting a much broader
interpretation of § 5.
76, 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959). See also Standard Oil Co. of California &:
Standard Stations, Inc. v. United States, !!!!7 U.S. 293 (1949); United States v. United
Shoe Mach, Co., 2!!4 F. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1916); United States v. Richfield Oil
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stances almost identical to those in the Nelson case, a violation of
section 3 was found. The defendant in Sun Oil was an integrated
oil company that produced and sold gasoline to numerous independent dealers. As a matter of policy, the company refused to enter
into a sales agreement unless the dealer orally or tacitly agreed to
handle only the defendant's gasoline and sponsored products. At
least one instance was cited by the plaintiff in which the sanction had
in fact been applied. After examining the entire scheme, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found a clear violation of section 3 and issued an injunction.77 Similarly, in Butterick
Company v. FTC,7 8 the court upheld an FTC order compelling
defendant manufacturer to cease and desist conduct that required
dealers in its standard garment patterns to deal exclusively, which
requirement was enforced through refusals to deal and threats of
such refusals. 79
It may be argued that the tw-o categories of litigants can be distinguished on the basis of remedies-the government seeks an injunction while a private party seeks damages. Yet such a distinction
is untenable because the crucial element-proximate cause-in reality is almost identical: the government alleges injury to the public in general as the basis of its claim, while the terminated dealer
alleges injury to himself. Both claims, however, are dependent upon
proof that the defendant and his distributors are illegally involved
in exclusive dealing. There is no reason to hold that the injury to
the general public is more "proximately" caused by this violation
than is the injury to the terminated dealer since neither party is directly involved in the scheme. Indeed, injury to the terminated
dealer seems more logically sustainable because the dealer's termination is a part of the seller's over-all scheme. This argument is bolstered by the treble-damages provision, which indicates a congressional policy to equate the public and private plaintiffs with regard
to enforcement of section 3.80 Nevertheless, the Nelson court interpreted section 3 as applying different standards to different plaintiffs and thereby frustrated the policy of Congress.
Besides these specific arguments, it should be emphasized that
the policy of antitrust law generally favors a more liberal view of
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd. per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952). But cf.
United States v. J.I. Case Co., IOI F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
77. 176 F. Supp. at 739.
78. 4 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1925). See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. FTC, 299 F.2d
839 (6th Cir. 1962); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940);
Pearsall Butter Co. v. FTC, 292 F. 720 (7th Cir. 1923).
79. As both Sun Oil and Butterick suggest, it is often significant that a defendant
in a § 3 suit used the threat of refusal to deal in order to obtain adherence to his
unlawful arrangement.
80. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
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the rights of a private plaintiff. In a comprehensive study of the policy of the antitrust laws, Kaysen and Turner have suggested that
there are four possible alternative goals for antitrust policy based on
past analysis and current needs: (1) performance, (2) limitation of
the power of big business, (3) fair dealing, and (4) protection of
competitive processes by limiting undue market power.81 Of the
four goals, the authors chose the fourth-protection of competition
-as the most desirable and feasible. 82 If that choice is correct, it
provides a strong case for granting a cause of action to the refused
dealer. The case is further enhanced by the authors' definition of
market power: "A firm possesses market power when it can behave
persistently in a manner different from the behavior that a competitive market would enforce on a firm facing otherwise similar cost
and demand situations.''83 The refusal-to-deal sanction is not an effective means of power unless it is a meaningful threat. In order for
the threat to be meaningful, the seller must have enough alternative
sources of distribution available or enough dealers willing to cooperate so that he will not commit economic suicide by threatening
the sanction on all his dealers. Thus, the very fact that he is able to
refuse to deal with the plaintiff should present a prima facie case of
market power. The same reasoning illustrates the harm that such
conduct causes the competitive process: if the dealer acquiesces,
harm to the competitive relationship between the seller and his
competitors is implicit in the arrangement; on the other hand, if he
refuses and is terminated while other dealers acquiesce, he becomes
a cog in the seller's broader plan to achieve exclusive dealing, since
his example makes the threat of termination more meaningful to
others. Either result is equally harmful to the competitive process.84
Even if protection of competition is not the paramount goal of
antitrust policy, at least two of the other goals suggested by Kaysen
and Turner-limitation on the power of big business and fair dealing-would favor upholding the refused dealer's case. By destroying
the seller's ability to refuse to deal as a part of an exclusive dealing
policy, a terminated dealer's private action under section 3 furthers
the policy of limiting the power of big business. 85 Moreover, the
81. C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, .ANTITRUST POLICY 11-23 (1959).
82. Id. at 44.
83. Id. at 75.
84. The purposes of § 3 are viewed in a broader manner, thus strengthening
the argument in favor of the refused dealer, in ArroRNEY GENERAL NATL, COMM. ON
ANTITRUST I.Aw, REPORT 130 (1955): "[C]ourts have viewed the Clayton Act's specific
prohibitions [as] designed to prevent anticompetitive business practices which would
result in unreasonable restraints."
85. The decision whether "big," as opposed to "small,'' business is involved in a
particular case could be made by determining whether a violation of § 3 caused a
"substantial lessening of competition" or tendency "to create a monopoly." See note 7

supra.
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use of coercive tactics in an attempt to force unwilling parties to
violate the law cannot reasonably be termed "fair dealing." The final goal, performance, may, however, favor disallowing a cause of
action. Although traditional economic theory teaches that the closer
pure competition is approximated, the more performance and efficiency will be promoted,86 it is more realistic to assume that the
predictability and stability provided by systems of exclusive-dealing
contracts are more conducive to efficiency. 87 Nevertheless, since the
other basic goals of antitrust law-protection of competition, limitation of the power of big business, and fair dealing-would all be
furthered by the allowance of causes of action for terminated dealers, it is clear that such claims have a strong basis in policy.
b. The Emerging Trend. The decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Nelson Radio &- Supply
Company v. Motorola 88 was for years the principal authority relied
upon by courts in denying causes of action to refused dealers.80 An
explicit statement to the contrary has been offered only by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which has stood alone in consistently and
unequivocally recognizing such a claim.90 However, recent decisions
in several other circuits indicate a trend away from the Nelson logic
and in favor of expanding the rights of terminated dealers. Even
the Fourth Circuit, in the case of Amplex of Maryland v. Outboard
Marine Corporation,91 has shown signs of moving toward the adaptation of a more flexible approach.92
Amplex had dealt for several years in the outboard motors and
accessories sold by Outboard Marine when it opened a branch store
removed from its central location. When Amplex began selling a com86. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 41 (7th ed. 1967).
87. Kessler & Stern, supra note 70, at 21. See also note 1 supra. For a comprehensive analysis of the role of efficiency in antitrust law, see Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
88. 200 F.2d 91 I (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
89. See pt. IT. B. 1. supra.
90. See Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964): Englander
Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959). In the Alles case, the
plaintiff alleged that it had distributed the defendant's staplers pursuant to an
agreement terminable by either party on sixty days notice. It also alleged that an implied term of the agreement was that the plaintiff would not sell products of the
defendant's competitors. When the plaintiff began selling staplers produced by other
manufacturers, the defendant threatened to terminate the distributorship agreement
and ultimately exercised its option to do so. The court of appeals stated rather tersely
that "the complaint states a cause of action under Section 3 of the Clayton Act." 329
F .2d at 570. The Englander Motors case gives a similarly brief treatment to the § !I
issue.
91. 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, !189 U.S. 1036 (1968).
92. See also Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), petition
for rehearing denied, 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1961), for a tying case in which the refused dealer was found to have a valid claim. But cf. McElhenney Co. v. Western
Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, !165 U.S. 834 (1960).
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petitive line of motors in the branch, the defendant first threatened
to cancel and then did cancel the plaintiff's distributorship. The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal under section 1
of the Sherman Act, but went on to discuss the ramifications of section 3 of the Clayton Act. The court found the cancellation in this
case to be merely a unilateral refusal to deal. 93 However, the court
stressed the fact that the plaintiff had alleged only one such refusal
and it implied that had the plaintiff shown that the termination of
its dealership was part of an over-all policy of exclusive dealing with
a number of dealers, achieved through coercive tactics, it would
have demonstrated the existence of a valid case. 04
The Ninth Circuit also appears to be shifting from the Nelson
position. In Leo ]. Meyberg Company v. Eureka Williams Corporation,9r, the plaintiff was allegedly terminated as a distributor of the
defendant's vacuum cleaners because he refused to deal on an exclusive basis. In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case. 06 However,
in the later case of Lessig v. Tidewater, 91 the court indicated a
change in its position. Lessig was a service station lessee and a dealer
in the defendant's products. He operated under a contract, extensively used by the defendant, that required dealers to purchase all
of their petroleum products from the Tidewater Oil Company. In
his suit, Lessig alleged that periodic inspections of his inventory,
threats of cancellation, and a system of rebates were used to insure
the cooperation of the plaintiff and of other dealers involved in the
exclusive-dealing arrangement and a system of resale price mainte93. The court stated:
Plaintiff's evidence, adduced and proffered, showed but one refusal by Outboard to
deal upon a dealer's failure to drop a competitive line; that was the cancellation,
or non-renewal, of plaintiff's own franchise; there was no evidence that the disenfranchisement of Amplex was held out threateningly as a deterrent to other
dealers; there was no evidence of any combination or conspiracy linking Outboard to its competitors or other dealers ••••
[T]he proof shows no more than a unilateral refusal to deal.
380 F.2d at 114-15.
94. In an amicus brief, the Justice Department supported the plaintiff in its petition for certiorari. The Justice Department took the position that a refusal to deal
is actionable by a private plaintiff when it has been used in an attempt to gain
adherence to an exclusive-dealing arrangement that would, if agreed to, be merely
one of a number of such contracts that could substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly. Brief for the Justice Department as Amicus Curiae, Amplex of
Maryland, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 389 U.S. 1036 (1968) (denying cert. to 380
F.2d ll2 (4th Cir. 1967)).
95. 215 F .2d 100 (9th Cir. 1954).
96. The court observed, "Prior to July, 1952, the contract between the parties did
not forbid appellant [plaintiff] to deal in products of a competitor of appellee. After
July, 1952, there was no contract, lease or sale between the parties at all. It is manifest
that there could be no violation of said section 3 by entering into an illegal lease, sale
or contract." 215 F.2d at IOI.
97. 327 F.2d 454 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
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nance and tying. Although not expressly overruling Leo ]. Meyberg,98 the court cast doubt upon that case's continuing validity
when it held:
The court's instructions conditioned recovery upon a finding that
Lessig entered into an exclusive dealing or tying arrangement with
Tidewater. But Lessig's charge was broader; he also alleged that
Tidewater sought to impose these arrangements upon all his dealers.
If Lessig proved damages to himself from such a course of conductfor example, by cancellation of his lease and dealer contract because
he refused to become a party to a system of illegal exclusive dealing
and tying arrangements-we see no reason why he could not recover.
. . . Doubt has been raised that proximate cause can be shown where
only the Clayton Act is offended, but we believe the distinction untenable. . . . Since it is the entire system of conditions and understandings which violates the Clayton Act, injury to a dealer resulting from Tidewater's efforts to establish and maintain that system is
injury "by reason of" conduct forbidden by the Act.99

Thus, the Ninth Circuit seems to have recognized the possibility
that a terminated dealer may be proximately injured by a system of
exclusive contracts between the defendant-seller and other dealers.
Although the district courts remain at odds,100 particularly in those
jurisdictions where a case has not yet reached the appellate courts,
it is apparent that the courts are becoming increasingly liberal in
construing the requirements for a valid cause of action by a terminated dealer, particularly when the plaintiff can show that the refusal was not unilateral but part of a broader policy of exclusive
dealing of the seller involving other dealers.
The Supreme Court indicated its concurrence with this trend in
its recent decision in Albrecht v. Herald Company. 101 Albrecht was
a distributor of the defendant's newspapers whose dealership had
been terminated for his failure to abide by a resale price maintenance scheme.102 Before resorting to termination, the defendant had
98. Rather than overrule Leo J. Meyberg, the court chose to distinguish it on the
ground that plaintiff's claim in the latter case was narrower. Lessig alleged that
defendant sought to impose these arrangements upon all of his dealers and that Lessig's cancellation was part of the over-all coercive conduct to effectuate the plan. 327
F.2d at 472.
99. 327 F.2d at 472-73 (footnotes omitted).
100. Compare Reliable Volkswagen Sales &: Serv. Co., Inc. v. World-Wide
Automobile Corp., 182 F. Supp. 412 (D.N.J. 1960) (court refused to grant summary
judgment for the defendant on the ground that a terminated dealer was not embraced by §§ 3 and 4, although summary judgment was granted for the defendant
when the plaintiff failed to show a substantial lessening of competition), with Campbell
Distrib. Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523 (D. Md. 1962) (no cause of
action).
101. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Comment, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
HARv. L. REv. 254 (1968); Note, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 862 (1969); Recent Development, 37
U. CIN. L. REv. 411 (1968).
102. On the illegality of such schemes, see note 39 supra.
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attempted to coerce the plaintiff into acquiescence by enlisting the
aid of a salesman to solicit plaintiff's customers and of another
dealer to deliver newspapers to those customers who were willing to
discontinue their subscriptions with the plaintiff. The district court
entered judgment for the defendant in the plaintiff's suit under
section I of the Sherman Act, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed on
the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of an illegal combination. In reversing, the Supreme Court first found the
requisite combination to exist between the defendant and the salesman and other dealer.103 Significantly, it went on to say that the
plaintiff could also have brought a successful suit by alleging injury
as a result of the defendant's combination with other dealers based
on the system of resale price maintenance agreements.104 By so stating, the Court presumably felt that the terminated dealer was indeed embraced by the proximate-cause requirement of section 4.
It should be apparent that recent cases involving exclusive dealing and analogous antitrust violations have reappraised the rights of
the terminated dealer. Decisions in these cases have indicated a willingness to recognize a dealer's claim when his termination was part
of an over-all plan of exclusive dealing involving other dealers. Implicit in such a rationale is a construction of the sale-or-contract-forsale requirement of section 3 and the proximate-cause requirement
of section 4 in a manner more consistent with the purposes of these
sections.

III.

REQUIREMENT OF A CONDffiON,

AGREEMENT, OR UNDERSTANDING

I£ he survives the procedural barrier of alleging a contract or
sale, a private plaintiff ordinarily should have little difficulty establishing the requisite condition, agreement, or understanding that
the purchasers not deal in the goods of a competitor of the seller.
It has long been recognized by the federal courts that the condition,
agreement, or understanding may be oral or tacit or merely implied
from a course of conduct. 105 The most common form of evidence is
103. The Supreme Court presented a unique discussion of the term "combination."
Typically, a combination or conspiracy has involved competitors or intermediaries
within the chain of distribution who benefited from the illegal scheme. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bausch &: Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). But the Court in Albrecht held that it was irrelevant
that the two other parties involved in the defendant's scheme had no interest in the
arrangement-other than the economic benefits that accrued from performing their
normal services-if they had been enlisted in the plan and had some knowledge of
the defendant's purpose. 390 U.S. at 150.
104. 390 U.S. at 154. On remand, the district court accepted the Court's rationale
and granted damages in favor of defendant. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 1971 Trade Cas.
89,868 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
105. See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater, 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
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proof of coercion by the seller in imposing such terms in the sales
agreement, and proof is not required that the dealer voluntarily acquiesced in the terms.106 It matters not that the defendant used the
ruse of agency consignment or other such contract, because the
court will look to the substance and not the form of such arrangements.107 It also appears to be clear from Albrecht v. Herald Company that if the alleged agreement or understanding was made with
third parties, it need not be shmvn that these other parties received
any benefit from the illegal arrangement.108
It should be noted that section 3 may not require any oral, tacit,
or other agreement concerning exclusive dealing between the parties, because section 3 declares illegal a contract or sale on the condition that the dealer not handle competitive goods. A condition is
generally defined as "A future and uncertain event upon the happening of which is made to depend the existence of an obligation.
. . ." 109 Prior to its fulfillment, a condition is a unilateral requirement imposed by the seller, and no acquiescence by the dealer is
required in order to show its existence. Thus, the term has a very
different substantive content from the terms "agreement" and "understanding," which denote bilateral conduct. Since section 3 of the
Clayton Act was drafted to deal specifically with certain offenses
that were not previously dealt with under the Sherman Act,11° the
unilateral quality of a condition becomes even more significant in
U.S. 993 (1964); Alles Corp. v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), afjd. per curiam, 343
U.S. 922 (1952). In McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 338
(4th Cir. 1959), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed: "Probably nothing is
more firmly settled in our antitrust jurisprudence than that an illegal contract may be
inferred from all the circumstances.••• [T]he [contract in question] could be supple•
mented by an extrinsic course of conduct from which the illegal condition or understanding might be found."
106. United States v. Sun Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959). See also McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1959), in which the
court said at 338: "It makes no difference whether this is voluntary or is imposed by
coercion, but without such agreement, condition or understanding, there can be no
statutory infraction."
107. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act found when defendant attempted to fix prices of gasoline distributors
under consignment contracts); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942)
(agency label does not protect price-fixing scheme from § 1 of the Sherman Act); United
States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), affd. per curiam, 343 U.S.
922 (1952) (agency ruled out as a defense in Clayton Act § 3 case when such an agreement in fact did not exist); Johnson. The Role of Agency and Sale in Antitrust: General Electric, Simpson, Schwinn, 53 MINN. L. R.Ev. 57 (1968).
108. 390 U.S. at 150.
109. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 365 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
110. The preamble to the original Clayton bill explained that its purpose was "to
prohibit certain trade practises which .•• singly and in themselves are not covered
by the [Sherman Act] ••••"A.NEALE, THE ANTITRusr LAws OF THE U.S.A. 178 (2d ed.
1970).
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light of the fact that section I of the Sherman Act deals with bilateral action.111 Thus, the terminated dealer in a typical case, such as
Nelson,iu should be able to argue successfully that, prior to termination, goods had been sold to him on the condition that he deal
exclusively with the seller and that it was only after he accepted
those goods and refused to abide by the accompanying condition
that he was canceled. In this manner, the requirement of a sale on
condition may be fulfilled and the plaintiff may allege a valid cause
of action.113 Since the precise issue has not yet arisen,114 it is unclear
whether the courts will interpret the term "condition" in this sense.
In any event, a dealer who has been terminated pursuant to an exclusive-dealing scheme should encounter little difficulty establishing
a condition, agreement, or understanding that purchasers not deal
in the goods of the seller's competitors.
Once the courts recognize a valid cause of action for terminated
dealers under section 3 of the Clayton Act, it does not automatically
follow that sellers will be stripped of their rights to exercise independent business discretion in choosing dealers or that sellers pestered by numerous small claims will be forced to settle essentially
invalid claims. The doctrine of United States v. Colgate,115 which
gives the seller a right unilaterally to refuse to deal,116 has been pre111. The section declares illegal contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
112. See discussion in pt. II. B. 1. supra.
118. Carried to its logical extreme, this argument concerning "condition" has much
broader implications. Consider, for example, the framework established with respect
to proximate cause in the text accompanying notes 51-52 supra. Assume that seller
XYZ distributes its products through dealers A, B, and C. It was shown that as soon
as A, B, or C acquiesced in an exclusive-dealing arrangement, another dealer who had
been terminated could then establish proximate cause, regardless of whether he knew
of the acquiescence. Use of the term "condition" in § 3, however, suggests that proximate cause can be established at an earlier stage of XYZ's plan. Assume that XYZ
makes simultaneous sales to A, B, and C on the condition that they deal exclusively
with him. The condition is unilateral since A, B, and C do not agree to it. None of
the three dealers abides by the condition, and XYZ thereafter refuses to deal with
A. According to a literal interpretation of § 8, XYZ has thus violated the Act
by making a sale on the condition that its distributors deal exclusively with it, even
though none actually honored his wishes. Moreover, because termination of A was
part of a plan to coerce B and C to acquiesce in the arrangement, A should be able
to fulfill the proximate-cause requirement of § 4 and recover damages for his termination.
114. The closest a court has come to isolating the three terms was in Lessig v.
Tidewater, 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), in which the
court of appeals briefly spoke solely in terms of "condition," 327 F.2d at 465, 468.
115. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
116. The Court there held: "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain
a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal, And, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell." 250 U.S. at 307.
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served, although in a modified form. 117 It has even been suggested
that the very reason for preserving the Colgate doctrine is to provide the lower courts with a tool for dismissing frivolous trebledamage actions.118 In any event, proof of a "condition, agreement or
understanding" is an evidentiary requirement that serves exactly
the same purpose-preserving the right of sellers to refuse to deal
for reasons that do not violate the antitrust laws. Such a right is illustrated in Timken Roller Bearing Company v. FTC.119 In that
case, defendant Timken engaged in a policy of urging dealers to
show loyalty by devoting themselves primarily to the resale of Timken bearings. The plaintiff testified that he had been terminated because he dealt in competitive products. However, other dealers testified that they felt free to deal in competitive goods and actually did
so. Since no condition, agreement, or understanding had been
117. The sweeping language of Colgate was modified by a series of subsequent decisions: United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1919); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1920); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co,, 257 U.S. 441 (1921);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1943). However, the crowning blow was not delivered until United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1959).
In that case, Parke, Davis engaged in an active program of maintaining resale prices of
retailers and utilized a variety of tactics. It published a catalogue with "suggested" retail prices. Retailers and wholesalers were orally induced to abide by such prices and
were encouraged to report violators. The most potent economic weapon utilized by
Parke, Davis, according to the Court, was the threat of refusal to deal with either retail•
ers who failed to observe the suggested minimum prices or wholesalers who deal with
such dealers. 362 U.S. at 45-46. While cautiously avoiding expressly overruling Colgate,
the Court found a violation of § I of the Sherman Act, because it concluded that
Parke, Davis had gone beyond a mere unilateral refusal to deal and had applied tactics
that effectuated adherence to its illegal policies and resulted in a combination between
it and the wholesalers. 362 U.S. at 46-47. In other words, when a seller, in a totally
isolated case or a series of isolated cases, refuses to deal with a distributor for any
reason, Colgate protects his independent discretion from prosecution under the antitrust laws. But the Court indicated that a seller is subject to prosecution when he
uses the threat of refusal to deal as a method of assuring compliance to a scheme violative of the antitrust laws and as a result suppresses competition. 362 U.S. at 47.
The Parke, Davis decision and previous decisions have produced a substantial controversy whether Colgate retains any significance today. See, e.g., Adams-Mitchell Co. v.
Cambridge Distrib. Co., 189 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion arguing that
if Colgate is not already overruled, it should be); Pitofsky & Dam, Is the Colgate Doctrine Dead?, 37 A.B.A. ANTITRusr L.J. 772 (1968); Note, Unilateral Refusals to Deal: King
Colgate is Dead!, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 537 (1969). But cf. Fulda, Individual Refusal To Deal:
When Does Single Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROB.
590 (1966); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 655 (1962): Weisbard, Resale Price
Maintenance, Exclusive Dealing and Tying Arrangements, IO ANTITRusr BuLL. 341
(1965). But regardless of the theoretical debate concerning its significance, the Colgate
doctrine continues to be applied by the courts today, particularly in the area of exclusive dealing. Pitofsky & Dam, supra at 782-83. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. FTC, 299 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1962); McElhenny Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co.,
269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1960); Nelson Radio & Supply Co.
v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
118. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962).
119. 299 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1962). See also United States v. J.I. Case Co., IOI F. Supp.
856 (D. Minn. 1951).
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shown, the court affirmed a verdict that was entered in defendant's
favor on the ground that "a seller has the right to select his own
customers. " 120
IV. AN

ALTERNATIVE: THE SHERMAN

Acr

The preceding discussion sought to show that a private plaintiff,
injured as a result of an exclusive-dealing arrangement, should be
able to seek redress under section 3 of the Clayton Act. Alternative
theories of relief, however, may be suggested. The most likely possibility would be suit under section I of the Sherman Act.121 That
section declares contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade to be illegal. The same policy arguments that favor
granting a cause of action to terminated dealers for violations of
section 3 of the Clayton Act-such as protection of competition and
inducement of private suits to deter antitrust violations-support
the allowance of similar claims under section I of the Sherman
Act.122 The similarity between the two sections is further reflected
by the fact that private litigants suing pursuant to section 3 have
usually also alleged violations of section 1. Similarly, when no violation of the Clayton Act provision is found, because the requirement
of a sale on condition is not present, the courts have refused to find a
violation of the Sherman Act on the ground that no contract, combination, or conspiracy exists.123
While exclusive-dealing arrangements may be found to violate
either section I of the Sherman Act124 or section 3 of the Clayton
Act, offenses under the different provisions involve different procedural and substantive factors. Moreover, even when identical considerations would appear to be involved, as in the case of the causation
requirement under section 4 of the Clayton Act, the courts have
120. 299 F .2d at 842.
121. 15 U.S.C. § I (1964). Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), will
not be considered since, although available, it is based on monopoly power that results
from vertical integration rather than exclusive dealing per se.
More radical and less feasible suggestions have also been made. For a discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of reading the words "offer" or "attempt" into § 3
of the Clayton Act or of amending the statute itself, see Kessler &: Stern, supra note
70, at 114-16. See also Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11, 15
(6th Cir. 1959), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated a willingness to
read "attempt" into § 3. In that case, a terminated dealer was held to have stated a
valid claim against a defendant who used short-term cancellation provisions a:; a
means of coercing compliance to exclusive-dealing arrangements.
122. See notes 61-72 supra and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959);
Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954);
Nelson Radio&: Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
!45 U.S. 925 (1953).
124. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); A. NEALE, supra
note 110, at 151,
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frequently applied different standards to cases brought under the
respective acts. For example, under either act, a private litigant is
given standing to sue by section 4 of the Clayton Act. Yet the courts
have inexplicably tended to be much more liberal in finding proximate cause when a Sherman Act offense, such as resale price maintenance, is involved. 125 It is possible that such liberality will be extended to the area of exclusive dealing and thus improve the plight
of the terminated dealer.
One of the significant distinctions in the nature of the exclusivedealing offense under the two acts lies in what has been called the
substantive, or economic, test. An exclusive arrangement is illegal
under section 3 whenever a not insubstantial amount of commerce
in the product is involved or when the seller's economic power with
respect to the exclusive product is sufficient to produce an appreciable restraint on trade. 126 To satisfy the economic test under the
Sherman Act, on the other hand, the Supreme Court has ruled that
both elements must be present.127 Nevertheless, since the dual requirements were first promulgated, the Court has gradually lessened
the market power requirement through a series of Sherman Act decisions culminating in Fortner Enterprises, Incorporated v. United
States Steel Corporation. 128 In Fortner, a case involving an illegal
tie-in of the purchase of prefabricated houses for the development
of two tracts of land and the financing of the purchase, the Court
suggested that it might be willing to eliminate the market power
criterion in section 1 cases. 129 Several lower-court decisions have also
indicated a willingness to apply the Clayton Act economic test to
cases arising under section 1 of the Sherman Act.180 If such a
trend continues, the substantive burden of bringing suit under section 1 of the Sherman Act will be alleviated and the refused dealer
may find that section 1 provides a more desirable route for his claim
than does section 3 of the Clayton Act.
125. See, e.g., A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); Halper, Individual Refusals To Deal: Customer Selection
or Dealer Protection, 22 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 49, 59 (1963). But cf. Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
126. See note 7 supra.
127. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See also
Lessig v. Tidewater, 327 F.2d 454 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
128. 394 U.S. 495 (1969). See also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962):
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55
CORNELL L. R.Ev. 161, 162 (1970).
129. 394 U.S. at 499-501. See also Handler, supra note 128, at 163.
130. See, e.g., Advance Business Sys. Supply Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62 (4th
Cir. 1969), in which the court said: "[A] seller's successful imposition of a tying arrangement on a substantial amount of commerce may be taken as proof of his economic
power over the tying product;" Seigal v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 1970 Trade Cas. 88,505,
88,508 (N.D. Cal. 1970), in which the court said: "[T]his court is of the opinion that
any distinction between the Sherman Act and Clayton Act with regard to the question
of market power is wholly artificial."
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Although the economic test may be more difficult under section I, the other elements of a section I claim should be much easier
for a plaintiff to establish than the elements of a claim under section 3. In order to show that a violation of section 3 has occurred, a
plaintiff must prove the existence of a sale or contract to sell and of
a condition, agreement, or understanding. Under section I of the
Sherman Act, the plaintiff need only establish the presence of a contract, conspiracy. or combination. The terms "combination" or
"conspiracy" in section I significantly enhance a plaintiff's chances
of pleading a valid claim, since the Supreme Court has long recognized the possibility of a vertical-horizontal combination or conspiracy between a seller and other dealers 131 and, in recent years, has
expanded the scope of these two terms.132
Although the section I cause of action would present significant
advantages to the refused dealer in establishing his claim, one important disadvantage should be noted. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
declares illegal a sale or contract to sell. Thus, by utilizing the sales
to other dealers as a basis for the violation, the refused dealer establishes a claim against the seller only; other dealers are not liable,
since they merely bought or contracted to buy. Since no similar restriction exists in section I of the Sherman Act, a refused dealer
would be able to sue other dealers as well as the seller. Although
this result might technically further the policy of the law against
exclusive dealing, it would appear to be an overly harsh measure in
the typical situation where the other dealers were coerced into an
exclusive-buying arrangement. This very problem may have influenced the courts in disallowing claims to terminated dealers pursuant to section I, although such reasoning is not apparent from the
cases. It would appear, however, that when the ultimate decision is
faced, construction of a judicial doctrine under section I of the
Sherman Act that does or does not encompass the acquiescing dealer
in the range of liability must depend upon the availability of section 3 of the Clayton Act as a more specific alternative and a weighing of the policies and equities involved in the particular section I
suit.1sa
131. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). The verticalhorizontal combination or conspiracy has not yet been recognized in the area of
exclusive dealing, however. Similarly, the courts have been unwilling to grant a cause
of action to the refused dealer on the basis of a group boycott theory. The group
boycott theory would be a useful one for plaintiffs, because a group boycott is a per
se violation of the antitrust laws. Barber, Refusals To Deal under the Antitrust Laws,
103 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 847, 872-77 (1955).
132. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), discussed in text accompanying notes 101-04 supra; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). See
generally Turner, supra note 117.
l!l3. A device that would avoid implicating other dealers, while establishing a
violation by the seller, might be the expanding doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy.
It is well established that a conspiracy can be found when one part of a corporate
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CONCLUSION

Regardless of the applicability of section 1 of the Sherman Act
to private remedies for exclusive dealing, it is the thrust of this
Comment that terminated dealers should be granted a cause of action under section 3 of the Clayton Act. In reaching this conclusion,
it was shown that section 4 of the Clayton Act encourages private
plaintiffs to enforce the antitrust laws when they have incurred injury as a result of a forbidden act. But although the federal government has consistently succeeded in prosecuting sellers for violating
the provisions of section 3 by written, oral, or tacit exclusive agreements, the interpretation given sections 3 and 4 in N elson134 and
many subsequent decisions has permitted sellers to employ the
refusal-to-deal sanction-a very effective sort of power-to violate
the antitrust laws while remaining immune from section 4 suits.135
Such an interpretation is not only contrary to the policy behind
sections 3 and 4 and the antitrust laws in general, but it also creates
an obvious inconsistency in enforcement of the law.
Section 3 does not expressly require that the sale or contract to
family conspires with another-for example, a conspiracy between a parent corporation
and a wholly owned subsidiary. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &: Sons, ll40
U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). However, due to the infrequent appearance of such
corporate structures in the area of exclusive dealing, such a doctrine provides little help
to the refused dealer.
A related theory that might be helpful to the refused dealer involves the concept
of a conspiracy formed among the officers and the corporation itself. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Nelson case found this theory to be "absurd": "It is
basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or entities to have a
conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a private
individual, and it is the general rule that the acts of an agent are the acts of a
corporation." 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952). It has been suggested, however, that the
doctrine of respondeat superior can be applied to establish the conspiracy. Under this
line of reasoning, each corporate officer involved in the establishment of exclusive
agreements is responsible, as an individual, for his acts. Moreover, such activity is
attributable to the corporation as well, because it is responsible for the acts of its
agents. Hence, when a corporation and its officers embark on an exclusive-dealing
program, the corporation may be held for conspiracy in restraint of trade. Kessler &:
Stern, supra note 70, at 88-89. At least two countervailing arguments have thus far been
successfully applied to prevent this analysis. First, a doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy would effectively replace § 1 with a naked restraint-of-trade doctrine. See Note,
Dealer Recovery for Unreasonable Refusals To Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 53 CoRNELL L. REv. 720, 733 (1968). And second, the proposed doctrine would
usurp the function of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), which was drafted
specifically to deal with such restraints.
134. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
135. The problem is succinctly stated in P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN lNTRoDUC·
TORY ANALYSIS 502 (7th ed. 1967):
As we have seen, the economist and the lawyer do not always see eye to eye. The
economist often feels that lawyers and the courts have concentrated on the letter
of the law, without defining its spirit with any precision. If a businessman should
be caught with an indiscreet set of letters in his files, the court throws the book at
him. But if another company has consistently done the same thing in less overt
fashion, it is immune from prosecution.
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sell on a condition, agreement, or understanding be with any specific party. Yet by finding that proximate cause is not fulfilled unless
the arrangement involves the plaintiff, the Nelson court effectively
read such a requirement into the Clayton Act and thereby seriously
limited the efficacy of the exclusive-dealing prohibition. It is submitted that a plaintiff should not be required to show that he was
a party to a sale or contract to sell in order to establish a valid cause
of action, as long as the actions directed toward the plaintiff were
part of an over-all policy of exclusive dealing. Similarly, it should
be unnecessary for the plaintiff to show that he was aware of the
cooperation of other dealers. To state a valid claim, the plaintiff
should only be required to show that one other dealer was, in fact,
involved in the scheme. The courts are beginning to recognize that
allowing the refused dealer a comprehensive cause of action is consistent with the basic antitrust policies of protecting competition,
competitors, and the discretion of individual dealers. Such interpretation is likely to be expanded, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court decisions in related areas. Yet the increased liberality
accorded the terminated dealer will not destroy the right of a seller
independently to exercise sound business discretion, because this
right is safeguarded by the necessity of proving an illegal condition,
agreement, or understanding and by the Colgate doctrine.136 In sum,
by fully utilizing section 3 of the Clayton Act as a basis for private
causes of action, the courts could implement the policy of the antitrust laws and provide remedies for terminated dealers injured by
illegal exclusive-dealing arrangements while not unduly infringing
the freedom of manufacturers and distributors.
186. See notes 115-18 supra and accompanying text.

